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Perspective
Who should decide how much and
what information is important in
person-centred health care?
Mette Kjer Kaltoft1, Jesper Bo Nielsen2, Glenn Salkeld3 and
Jack Dowie4
Abstract
Most guidelines for clinical practice, and especially those for the construction of decision support tools, assume that the
individual person (the patient) needs to be in possession of information of particular sorts and amount in order to qualify
as having made an ‘informed decision’. This often implicitly segues into the patient having made a ‘good decision’. In
person-centred health care, whether, in what form, and with what weight, ‘information’ is included as a criterion of
decision quality is a matter for the person involved, to decide in the light of their own values, preferences, and time and
resource constraints.
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It seems taken-for-granted by many interested in a
patient’s health care decision making, and in providing
decision support for it, that only an informed decision
can be a good decision, let alone the best possible deci-
sion. Being informed is proposed as a necessary, almost
suﬃcient, condition of decisional empowerment, even
when there can be no guarantee that the information is
translated into understanding. The irony is that this
orthodoxy has largely been arrived at without input
from those making the decisions.
It is time to question this orthodoxy. Decision qual-
ity is a multi-dimensional concept and, therefore, by
deﬁnition, its assessment is sensitive to the criteria
used to determine it and the preference weights
attached to them. Currently, decision quality is assessed
formally or informally by methods which are domi-
nated by the externally deﬁned and assessed informa-
tion state of the patient. As a result, he or she is denied
the right to decide the attributes of a good decision and
assign his or her own personal importance weights to
those considerations including how much and what
information is important to him/her.
Against the background of the vast literature on nor-
mative, prescriptive and descriptive approaches to deci-
sion making (Lipshitz and Cohen1 provide an accessible
introduction), we do not have the absurdly broad aim
of deﬁning a good decision. We merely seek to make a
narrow point concerning the place currently assigned to
‘being informed’ in assessing the quality of a clinical
decision. From the perspective of person-centred
health care, the assumption that ‘being informed’ can,
and should, be deﬁned external to the individual at the
point of decision, needs to be challenged. This includes
questioning the closely related assumption that the rela-
tive importance to be attached to information criteria
in evaluations of clinical decision quality and decision
support tools can be deﬁned without reference to the
preferences of the individuals in the speciﬁc clinical
setting.
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Person-centred decision making
Let us take an example from daily life. An individual,
as a consumer researcher, wants to buy a refrigerator.
With appliances of most sorts, people regard best prac-
tice decision making as consulting trustworthy com-
parison websites and magazines, ones that go beyond
expressing opinions, or recording ‘likes’, to numerically
rate the alternative products on a set of attributes or
criteria. They want these decision support tools to give
them ratings that can be trusted because they are pro-
duced free of any conﬂict of interest or other biases. We
will refer to them as the BEANs – Best Estimates
Available Now. The consumer does not know, and
does not want to know, why this refrigerator is given
a 4*/80% rating on ‘reliability’, and a 3*/60% rating on
‘environmental impact’, and another one the opposite
ratings. Feeling justiﬁed in assuming a common sense,
lay understanding of the terms ‘reliability’ and ‘envir-
onmental impact’, they do not have neither the time nor
motivation to ﬁnd out more about what these concepts
mean, in terms of the mechanical functioning of the
refrigerator, the quality of its components, the emis-
sions it produces or whatever else contributes to these
ratings made by the expert assessors. They do not want
to know more about how a refrigerator works.
Some may wish to establish whether consumers have
made ‘an informed decision’ by seeing how well they
score on a test of refrigerator knowledge. Giving con-
siderable and ﬁxed weight to knowledge in their meas-
ures of decision quality, consumers’ decisions might be
regarded as poor quality, because their knowledge sub-
score is low.2,3 In contrast, consumers may regard
themselves as having made good decisions, indeed the
best possible decisions they could make, given the time
and cognitive eﬀort they are willing to devote to
research into the decision-making process including
accessing and accumulating knowledge deemed import-
ant, even essential, by others.
But surely health care decisions are diﬀerent from
buying refrigerators? Choosing between surgery and
medical options for newly-diagnosed cancer, or pain
management for chronic osteoarthritis, is not like
buying a household appliance, is it? In fact, nothing
really changes for the individual, whom we now con-
ceptualize as a researcher conducting a continuing,
informal n-of-1 study into his/her health. The aﬀective
and emotional diﬀerences between the two situations
may well produce diﬀerences in the decision-making
process, but the patient accepts that this will not
necessarily enhance the quality of the decision – as
he/she deﬁnes it. Patients may become interested in
ﬁnding out more about their medical condition than
they would about refrigerators, and actually do so.
But unless it leads to a change in a performance
rating for an available option on one of their criteria
– especially the ‘BEAN’ for a criterion they weigh
heavily – the additional information they now possess
is decision-neutral. People-as-researchers may feel
better informed in some sense, but they realize they
will not necessarily be in a position to make a better
decision and therefore have not ended up more deci-
sionally empowered. They may even simply have
become more anxious and regretful about the oppor-
tunity costs of acquiring the information, in the form
of the foregone beneﬁts from other activities in which
they could have engaged.
Have these patients made an ‘informed’ decision?
According to themselves and us, absolutely, since they
have consulted a transparent set of option performance
ratings on relevant criteria, originating from a source
that they have decided is the most trustworthy. They
have combined these with their criterion importance
weights. Their decision quality score may well be low
according to an instrument that weights highly the
knowledge that they are assumed by others to need to
make an ‘informed’ decision. The growing number of
condition-speciﬁc decision quality instruments being
developed, notably by Karen Sepucha and colleagues,
all give very heavy weight to a knowledge subcompo-
nent.4–6 There could be no clearer conﬁrmation of the
issue at stake here than the title of one of the back-
ground papers to these projects: ‘How does feeling
informed relate to being informed?’7
Trust
Trust is crucial here. In either shared or unshared deci-
sion making, trust relates to the inputs into decision
making, since we have left behind the notion of an
agency relationship, previously dominant in conceptua-
lising medical practice. Trust is always a matter of
degree, rather than a binary all or nothing, whether it
relates to the BEANs provided by the clinician, or by a
decision support tool. Furthermore, it is always the
relative trustworthiness of the sources that matters.
Even if there is only one, dubious, source, it will be
the most trustworthy. Unless, that is, the person rates
his/her own estimates as more trustworthy than the best
source, since – it is easy to forget – these will always be
the ultimate assessment. So we envisage an individual
regarding the respected consumer magazine’s BEANs
on refrigerators as the most trustworthy in relation to
that purchase decision. People’s task in health care
decisions, given a restricted willingness to devote time
and energy to processing information, is to assess
the trustworthiness of the available sources of
BEANs for the outcomes and other criteria important
to them. They would expect a clinician, or a team
developing the ratings for a decision aid, to be highly
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trustworthy and to be provided with evidence for this,
especially in the case of an aid.
The key information the person-as-researcher
requires is labelling that ensures he/she will get ‘what
it says on the tin’ when they open an aid. With this
meta-information, they can make an informed choice
about which tins of what size to open.
The other major problem with any imposed infor-
mation requirement is that it condemns many on the
continuum of health literacy, and especially health
numeracy, to receiving little or no help. We fully sup-
port attempts to reduce health illiteracy and innumer-
acy, especially their decision-focused forms. However,
it is too much to expect of a decision support tool – or a
clinician – to overcome the limitations of previous edu-
cation and socialization in these respects. Moreover, it
is important to accept that even if aid users are able to
register and report the relative numbers of sad and
smiley faces in frequency diagrams, or repeat back ‘1
in x’ statements – about which there is considerable
doubt8,9 – this does not in any way ensure that they
can meaningfully incorporate the numerical probabil-
ities they have correctly registered (say 10% and .05%,
or 1 in 10 and 1 in 2000), into their decisions. This is not
to say that a decision aid should not contain help in this
respect, including guidance on how the person can best
avail themselves of what it oﬀers, and information on
the bases of that oﬀering. It is to suggest that much of
this should be provided on an opt-in basis.
The wider contexts of person-centred
health care
Nothing in what we have said is intended to imply that
the community is not entitled to apply community-level
criteria and weights to what it provides, or allows to be
provided, to whom, under what conditions, and at what
cost, in the pursuit of goals such as eﬃciency, equity
and justice. Formal laws and regulations (including
those on informed consent and clinician liability) and
resource allocation policies (including reimbursement
decisions) will be the context in which the individual
decision is made, and they will frequently be in conﬂict
with what an individual sees as best for him/herself,
given personal criteria and weights. External conse-
quences for others may trump individuals’ preferences,
as in the case of infectious diseases. But that is life as
lived in society.
Trickier are the issues of social responsibility or mor-
ality which are not dealt with formally. Apart from
issues of environmental and social impact (such as
those arising from hormonal treatments and opioids),
there are all those that arise in resource-constrained
and interdependent systems simply as a result of those
constraints and interdependencies. In these cases, we
say two things. First, it is not the function of individual
decision support tools to mandate the inclusion or
exclusion of ‘social’ criteria in an individual’s set,
such as concern for others’ health, or insist that these
be given speciﬁc weights. Those are tasks for the bodies
politic and cultural, through education and debate.
However, the support should permit and facilitate
inclusion or exclusion of such ‘externalities’, to the
maximum practical degree possible, as items in a
‘Pick Your Own’ criteria menu made available to the
person-as-researcher. Second, that in order to be
regarded as having made a high-quality decision, the
individual should not be required to be informed
about the social criteria they do select, other than
having the processed BEANs available to them from
a trustworthy source.
Normative checklists for decision support tools,
such as those constructed in accordance with the guide-
lines of the IPDASi collaboration,10 are clearly
intended to promote person-as-patient empowerment.
But most decision aids that comply with these guide-
lines are designed for use only within the context of
shared decision making, in which the person is assigned
the status of patient. In many cases, the support can be
accessed only within the clinical encounter, or with pro-
vider permission. They all perpetuate the idea that only
a decision informed in a particular way and to a par-
ticular extent can be a good decision.
We do not need the concept of an ‘informed deci-
sion’, only that of a good, better or best possible deci-
sion. For none of these will there be a deﬁnition that is
not multi-dimensional and therefore preference-sensi-
tive. The question is to whose preferences should
the deﬁnition be sensitive? There can only be one
answer: the patient’s – or the person’s if they are not
a patient.
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